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The United States Supreme Court and 
Treasure Salvage: Issues Remaining After 
Brother Jonathan 
JOHN PAUL JONES* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 22, 1998, the United States Supreme Court announced its 
decision in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 1 a case of shipwreck 
salvage begun as a maritime action in rem. Because the Court does not often 
accept cases of admiralty and maritime law, its decision was eagerly 
anticipated by American maritime lawyers and constitutionalists, both for 
what it might say about the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity 
in a federal system and how it might limit Congressional power to alter the 
general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. 
Also anxious for the Court's decision were the few maritime lawyers who 
practice what has become known as treasure salvage law. Recent advances 
in technologies for locating sunken wrecks and retrieving what remains have 
put within easy reach an accumulation of shipwrecks lost and forgotten for 
ages. As well as the lawyers, state governments, historic preservationists, 
marine archaeologists, professional shipwreck hunters, and recreational 
scuba divers all looked forward to the resolution of the case of the Brother 
Jonathan. They hoped for the Court's resolution of a variety of issues that 
recently had emerged on the line in general maritime law where the law of 
salvage abuts the law of finds. The case seemed to promise as well answers 
to a number of questions about the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 
("ASA"),2 a sweeping legislative intervention apparently governing ship-
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Associate Editor, Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce. B.A., Marquette University; J.D., University of San Diego; LL.M., Yale University. The 
author is indebted to the professional staff of the William T. Muse Law Library for their generous and 
expert assistance in the research for this article, and to David G. Concannon, Esq., for his continuing 
interest and very useful comments. 
1118 S. Ct. 1464, 1998 AMC 1521 (1998). 
243 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2106. 
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wrecks and other marine archaeological sites on or in the bed of the 
territorial waters of the several United States. 
What the Court actually decided, however, was far short of what it might 
have decided. The unanimous opinion of the Court offers a simple enough 
answer to one very narrow question about the Eleventh Amendment. In 
addition, it hints at the answer to one narrow question about the proof 
required in a small number of shipwreck salvage cases, and, at best, invites 
an answer from the lower courts to another. Many other questions are left 
unanswered. What follows is an examination of the Supreme Court's 




The Brother Jonathan was a wooden-hulled, side-wheeled passenger 
steamship, 220 feet long. She was built in 1850 for the Panama route to the 
California gold fields. In 1856, she was sold to the California Steamship 
Company, which then ran her up and down the west coast.3 On July 28, 
1865, she left San Francisco, bound for Portland and Vancouver, carrying 54 
crew members and 109 passengers, as well as a shipment of gold bullion and 
an Army payroll.4 After a scheduled stop at Crescent City, she resumed her 
voyage the next morning. Encountering dangerously heavy seas, she turned 
back toward Crescent City. Approximately 4.5 miles off the coast, near St. 
George Reef, she struck a submerged rock and sank in less than an hour, to 
a depth of approximately 250 feet. Very few of her passengers and crew 
survived.5 Later, five insurance companies paid $48,490 for the loss of the 
3Brieffor Petitioners at 2-3, California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1998 AMC 1521 
(1998) (No. 96-1400). 
4The numbers of those aboard are from the opinion of the district court. See Deep Sea Research, Inc. 
v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1347, 1995 AMC 1682 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In their brief to the 
United States Supreme Court, California and her State Lands Commission averred that, on her last 
voyage, the Brother Jonathan carried "approximately 250 passengers and crew." Brief of Petitioners, 
supra note 3, at 4. That her cargo contained both gold bullion and an Army payroll is reported in the 
opinion of the Court, referring to a contemporary news story in the San Francisco Chronicle. 118 S. Ct. 
at 1467. 
5 According to the opinion of the district court, sixteen survived. 883 F. Supp. at 1347. According to 
the Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 4, nineteen survived. 
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gold comprising a portion of her cargo.6 It is not clear that the vessel herself 
was insured, or the remainder of her cargo. 
For many years, the exact location of the wreck was unknown. In the 
1930' s, a fisherman found 22 pounds of gold in bars somewhere in the 
vicinity of her resting place, but the finder went to his grave without sharing 
the location or details of his find. Although it was established that the 
fisherman's gold was minted in 1865, it could not be confirmed that it 
comprised part of the cargo shipped aboard the Brother Jonathan.7 
In 1994, Deep Sea Research, Inc. ("DSR") brought an action in rem in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming 
to have found the wreck of the Brother Jonathan. DSR sought an order of 
arrest and recognition both as a salvor entitled to exclusive possession of the 
wreck and as the successor to the owners of the insured bullion, having 
obtained from their insurance companies title to the gold, which had passed 
to them when they paid the claims. 
The State of California intervened, asserting title to the wreck under both 
the ASA and§ 6313 of the California Public Resources Code,8 and moved 
for dismissal of the action on the ground that a suit in rem involving property 
to which a state claimed title was one prohibited by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. In the ASA, the United States asserted title to certain shipwrecks on, 
or embedded in, the submerged lands of the states and transferred it to the 
state on (or in) whose submerged lands the wrecks were located.9 In § 6313, 
California asserted title to all abandoned shipwrecks on the submerged lands 
of California, as well as to all those in her tidal waters. 10 
DSR answered by denying that the wreck of the Brother Jonathan had 
6 According to the district court, the insurance companies paid for the loss of the vessel. 883 F. Supp. 
at 1347. According to their brief to the Supreme Court as amici curiae, the insurance companies paid for 
the loss of a commercial cargo of gold shipped aboard the vessel. Brief of Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 
et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at I, California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 
1464, 1998 AMC 1521 (1998) (No. 96-1400). 
7118 S. Ct. at 1467. 
8Cal. Pub. Res. Code§ 6313. 
9In the Act, the United States asserts title to abandoned shipwrecks embedded in the submerged lands 
of a state or in coralline formations protected by a state on the state's submerged lands, as well as those 
ships on the submerged lands of a state that are included in the National Register of Historic Places or 
eligible for the National Register. The Act transfers title to such wrecks to the states in or on whose 
submerged lands the wrecks are found. According to the Act, the United States retains title to abandoned 
shipwrecks in or on submerged lands owned by the United States, and Indian tribes retain title to 
abandoned shipwrecks in or on submerged lands owned by the tribe. 43 U.S.C. § 2105. For purposes of 
the Act, a shipwreck is defined as "a vessel or wreck, its cargo, and other contents." 43 U.S.C. § 2102. 
The Act does not offer a definition of "abandoned." 
10In § 6313, California also asserts title to all submerged sites with archaeological or historical 
interest. Salvage of abandoned shipwrecks is made subject to a permit to which the State Lands 
Commission may attach conditions, including compliance with "contemporary professional standards of 
archaeological date recovery." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 6313. 
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ever been abandoned, so that neither the ASA nor § 6313 applied, and by 
attacking both statutes as unconstitutional if they did. The attack on the ASA 
prompted intervention by the United States, at first only to defend the federal 
statute, but later also to assert ownership of any federal property that might 
be recovered from the wreck. 11 
To act on the motions, the district court scheduled hearings to determine, 
first, where the vessel's remains were located, and, second, whether the 
wreck had been abandoned within the meaning of the ASA or § 6313, so that 
the state could make a claim to title based on either of the statutes, and 
thereby implicate the Eleventh Amendment. 12 Before the first hearing could 
take place, DSR and California agreed that, as far as California's motion to 
dismiss was concerned, the wreck of the Brother Jonathan was in the state's 
territorial sea. 13 This stipulation relieved DSR from having to reveal with 
greater exactitude the wreck's location, a fact of which the state was still at 
that time in ignorance. 
At the second hearing, the court obliged the state not only to assert, but to 
prove that the Brother Jonathan was abandoned. According to California, 
the United States Supreme Court had ruled in Florida Department of State 
v. Treasure Salvo rs, Inc., 14 that the Eleventh Amendment left a federal court 
with no choice but to dismiss an action in rem when a state intervened, so 
long as the state could make a claim of title to the res that was at least 
"colorable." In California's view, the Court had intended to convey by that 
qualifier the point that a state's ownership claim could be sufficient to 
implicate the Eleventh Amendment without being proven by any evidence at 
all. The district court chose instead to interpret colorable as conveying an 
expectation that the state do more than baldly assert title if it would invoke 
11883 F. Supp. at 1348. 
121d. 
13Id. at 1348 n.4. 
14458 U.S. 670, 1983 AMC 144 (I 982). In Treasure Sa/vars, those who located a 17th century 
shipwreck reached an agreement with the State of Florida for a share of what they recovered. Eventually, 
when it was determined that the site of the wreck was outside Florida waters after all, they sued in 
admiralty for a salvage award and for confirmation of their title to the wreck as its finders. When state 
custodians refused to return certain artifacts that had been recovered from the site by the salvors, the 
salvors petitioned the court for an order directing the state custodians to surrender the artifacts. The state 
intervened and moved to quash the order on the ground that it and the action from which it stemmed 
violated the Eleventh Amendment. The motion was denied, Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified 
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 1980 AMC 646 (S.D. Fla. 1978), and the 
district court's decision was affirmed on appeal. See 621 F.2d 1340, 1981 AMC 1529 (5th Cir. 1980). 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. No opinion attracted a majority of the Court, 
although all but Justice Brennan agreed that the Eleventh Amendment could bar an action in rem when 
title is at issue and the state appears and contests it. Three other justices joined an opinion written by 
Justice Stevens, in which Florida's statutory and contractual claims were assessed and found too tenuous 
to be "colorable," that is, to justify quashing on Eleventh Amendment grounds an order to the state 
custodians to yield possession of the artifacts. 
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the Eleventh Amendment to secure dismissal of an action in rem. The district 
court therefore opted to treat the state's demand for dismissal in accordance 
with the Eleventh Amendment as it would other affirmative defenses, 
putting the state to proof of its claim of title. Apparently out of deference to 
the state's correlative sovereignty, however, the federal court elected not to 
treat California as it would others who asserted title to a vessel as a result of 
her abandonment. Forgoing maritime law's ordinary standard of proof for 
abandonment-evidence both clear and convincing-the court settled for 
the ordinary standard of proof for affirmative defenses, a preponderance of 
the evidence. 15 
To meet this burden, the court expected California to prove more than 
simply that many years had passed during which owners of the vessel and 
her cargo had failed even to locate her final resting place. 16 Mistakenly 
anticipating that its averment of the Brother Jonathan's abandonment would 
by itself be enough to warrant dismissal, the state proved able to offer little 
else in the way of real evidence of abandonment. The state's sole witness, a 
historian who had made only a cursory investigation during the eight days 
immediately before the hearing, admitted that he had neither searched 
insurance records nor contacted the companies that had paid on claims 
arising from the Brother Jonathan's loss. Nor could he produce any 
evidence of a public disclaimer by the vessel's owners or her insurers. 
Meanwhile, DSR proved that only in the last three years had there occurred 
technological improvements in sonar and mixed-gas breathing systems 
significantly enhancing the feasibility of locating the Brother Jonathan and 
of working at a depth such as that at which the wreck was to be found. 
In the view of the district court, a preponderance of this evidence did not 
prove that the Brother Jonathan had been abandoned. Accordingly, the court 
denied California's motion and granted DSR's motion, issuing a warrant of 
arrest. 17 In addition, the court named DSR both substitute custodian of the 
wreck and salvor in possession. After some negotiating of the description of 
the wreck's precise location, the court enjoined competing salvage opera-
tions in the vicinity of the wreck for eighteen months. Because the state had 
failed to establish that the vessel or her wreck had been abandoned, the court 
15883 F. Supp. at 1348-50. 
16In light of DSR's claim as successor to title to the insured portion of the bullion cargo, California 
tried unsuccessfully to persuade the court that abandonment sufficient for either statute could be partial 
where, as here, no claimant asserted title to the vessel or to her uninsured contents, cargo, or otherwise. 
The court was loathe to interpret the ASA in a manner that would have ousted an action in rem for only 
some of a shipwreck, so that both federal and state courts would then have to be involved. Id. at 1353-54. 
17The court directed the United States marshal to serve the warrant on artifacts retrieved from the 
wreck, "brought into the district and deposited into the custody of the court." Id. at 1359. 
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found neither the ASA nor § 6313 applicable, 18 and therefore decided that 
questions regarding the constitutionality of each could be left unanswered. 
California appealed, assigning as errors both the district court's insistence 
that a state's claim of title had to be supported by sufficient evidence before 
it could compel dismissal of an action in rem and the court's insistence that 
something more than the passage of time and prolonged inaction by the 
owner was required to prove abandonment. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state was properly 
put to proof that it had a claim of title before it could compel dismissal of 
an action in rem. In both courts, California had relied heavily on Marx v. 
Government of Guam, 19 in which the court of appeals had reversed a district 
court's denial of a motion by the territorial government to dismiss a salvor's 
action in rem for possession and title of the wrecks of two Spanish galleons. 
In Marx, the court of appeals had found sufficiently colorable the 
government's claim to title of the wrecks by reason of their abandonment 
and the Underwater Historic Property Act,20 a federal law conveying to 
Guam and other territories title to adjacent submerged lands. Guam therefore 
was not obliged to offer proof of any sort that the galleons had been 
abandoned before it could obtain dismissal pursuant to the Eleventh 
Amendment. In the instant case, however, the court of appeals found 
California's reliance on Marx misplaced because the ASA had meanwhile 
become effective. Because the very federal law from which California 
purported to derive its title also preempted state law on the subject, the 
question of title was now exclusively one of federal law, warranting greater 
inquiry by the court into the substance of the state's claim. 
Having endorsed the district court's decision to put California to proof 
that its ownership claim was colorable because the Brother Jonathan had 
been abandoned, the court of appeals turned to the measure of abandonment. 
California argued that the district court had erred by following the decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Columbus-
America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,21 thereby 
requiring the state to prove that the owner of the Brother Jonathan (or its 
successors) had expressly renounced its ownership of the vessel or her 
wreck. Apparently agreeing with California's interpretation of the Fourth 
Circuit's position in Columbus-America Discovery Group, the Ninth Circuit 
nevertheless disagreed that the court below had in fact required of California 
18The district court also concluded that the ASA preempted § 6313, not only for shipwrecks covered 
by the federal statute but also for other shipwrecks in the navigable waters of the United States. Id. at 
1357. 
19866 F.2d 294, 1989 AMC 896 (9th Cir. 1989). 
2048 u.s.c. § 1705. 
21 974 F.2d 450, 1992 AMC 2705 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. IOOO (1993). 
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nothing less than proof of express renunciation by the vessel's prior owners. 
Instead, the court of appeals found that the district court had held California 
to the traditional test for abandonment under maritime law, a test that could 
be satisfied by evidence of either an express renunciation by the owners of 
a wrecked vessel, or of the lapse of time and other circumstances from which 
a wreck's abandonment could be inferred. The appellate court then declined 
to treat as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that California had 
failed this test for proving the abandonment of the Brother Jonathan.22 
California then petitioned successfully to the United States Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari. To the Supreme Court, the case presented three 
issues: 1) whether a state had to prove that its claim of title to a res was at 
least colorable when the state sought on Eleventh Amendment grounds 
dismissal of a salvor's action in rem; 2) whether the ASA preempted 
application of state law regarding title to shipwrecks in state waters even 
when the wreck in question was not covered by the federal statute; and, 3) 
whether the Brother Jonathan was abandoned for purposes of the ASA 
despite the claim of insurers who had paid claims on a portion of her cargo. 23 
In a unanimous opinion penned by Justice O'Connor, the Court found that 
the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to a maritime action in rem if the 
res is not in the possession of the state.24 Drawing on The Davis,25 The 
Siren,26 and The Pesaro,27 earlier cases involving maritime actions in rem in 
which the sovereign immunity of the United States or a foreign government 
was unsuccessfully interposed when the subject vessels were not in the 
government's possession, the Court found the same limitation apt for the 
similar immunity afforded states by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Affirming the decisions of the courts below on this basis made moot the 
other questions presented to the Court.28 For the time being at least, the 
22California also failed to persuade the court of appeals that the district court had erred in refusing to 
treat the remains of the vessel and the uninsured portions of her cargo as abandoned because nobody had 
appeared claiming their ownership. The reviewing court found treatment of the wreck, including both the 
insured and uninsured cargo and the vessel, as a single res to be well-justified both in maritime law and 
by the confusion the court foresaw from separate adjudication of various portions of the wreck in state 
and federal courts. !02 F.3d at 388-89. 
23118 S. Ct. at 1469-70. 
24Id. at 1473. 
2577 U.S. (IO Wall.) 15 (1869) (salvor's action against commercial vessel and cotton cargo shipped 
by an agent of the United States government). 
2674 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868) (claim for damages from collision while under the command of a prize 
master was not barred because condemnation amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity). 
27255 U.S. 216 (1921) (ambassador's suggestion of government ownership made directly to the court 
does not warrant dismissal of action in rem). 
28Justice O'Connor explained this conclusion by writing: 
In light of our ruling that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar complete adjudication of the 
competing claims to the Brother Jonathan in federal court, the application of the ASA must be 
reevaluated. Because the record before this Court is limited to the preliminary issues before the 
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Court could refrain from attempting to describe more precisely than it had in 
Treasure Salvors what burden could be imposed on a state in possession of 
the property subject of a maritime action in rem as a precondition to 
dismissal of the action in accordance with the Eleventh Amendment. The 
Court also excused itself from deciding whether the ASA preempted similar 
state laws even as to shipwrecks and marine artifacts beyond the reach of the 
federal statute and whether the ASA was constitutional. Beyond those 
questions relating to the new federal statute remains a second tier of 
unresolved or disputed issues of the general maritime law of salvage and 
finds. As to them, the Court remains for now silent. 
Almost as an aside, the Court's opinion closes with very limited directions 
relevant to the ASA. Explicitly directing the district court to reconsider 
application of the Act to the wreck of the Brother Jonathan, the Supreme 
Court directed the court to reinterpret the ASA, this time free of any 
inhibition arising from Eleventh Amendment concerns. What the Supreme 
Court intended to convey by this direction is not perfectly clear, but it seems 
to suggest that California need not be excused from the burden of proof 
imposed generally in a maritime in rem action on private parties asserting 
ownership as a result of abandonment by the previous owners. In addition, 
the Court specified that the meaning to be imparted to the word "abandoned" 
in the ASA is the meaning abandoned is afforded in general maritime law.29 
The Court did not say more. 
District Court, we decline to resolve whether the Brother Jonathan is abandoned within the 
meaning of the ASA. We leave that issue for reconsideration on remand, with the clarification that 
the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law. 
118 S. Ct. at 1473. It is not as if the Congressional authors of the ASA left for speculation the meaning 
they intended for the word "abandonment" as it appears in the statute. According to the House Report, 
"The Committee notes that the term 'abandoned' does not require the original owner to actively disclaim 
title or ownership. The abandonment or relinquishment of ownership rights may be implied, or otherwise 
inferred, as by an owner never asserting any control over or otherwise indicating his claim of possession 
of the shipwreck." H.R. Rep. No. 514(I), IOOth Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 366. Perhaps the sub-text of the Supreme Court's declaration in Deep Sea Research, 
that abandonment in the ASA means abandonment under admiralty law, is that the Court took the 
Committee's definition in its report merely as its attempt to say what admiralty law says, and that the 
Court is at least skeptical of the success of that attempt. Respecting shipwrecks older than the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899, the ASA Guidelines published by the Department of the Interior ("DOI") say only 
that a shipwreck is abandoned if "title voluntarily has been given up by the owner with the intent of never 
claiming a right or interest in the future and without vesting ownership in any other person." 55 Fed. Reg. 
50116, 50120 (1990). 
29 118 S. Ct. at 1473. 




Advances in the technologies of underwater search and recovery have 
abruptly opened to salvage wrecks long lost and put out of mind. What was 
once impossible, then merely prohibitively expensive and dangerous, is now 
commercially, even recreationally, viable. The very narrow holding of the 
Supreme Court in Deep Sea Research means that answers to most of the 
legal questions dividing shipowners, salvors, historic preservationists, ma-
rine archaeologists, recreational scuba divers, and the admiralty courts in 
which their divisions are presented must await another day. What follows is 
a list of ten of the most pressing questions, and the directions in which lower 
courts have moved toward their resolution. 
1. What does abandonment mean for a salvor claiming a find? 
The maritime law of salvage has traditionally treated abandonment simply 
as a factor going to the salvor's right to temporarily possess a ship, her 
cargo, or her equipment against the objections of her owner,30 or as a factor 
in quantifying the risk from which the salvors have extricated whatever it is 
they have saved.31 The salvor's usual reward for locating and recovering an 
abandoned vessel or her remains, including her cargo or equipment, has been 
payment from the proceeds of a court-ordered sale of the recovered property, 
the remainder to be held by the court against a claim by the owner. 
Otherwise, in the owner's discretion, money or other things of value equal 
to that of the salved vessel or goods could be substituted prior to the 
judgment as a fund from which the salvor' s reward would subsequently be 
deducted. 32 In a few cases of derelict, where the owner failed to appear, 
either to defend against the salvor or else to assert ownership within a year 
and a day of the marshal's sale, courts have awarded to the salvor the 
remaining share of the sale proceeds. 33 
3°T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 14-7 (2d ed. 1994); M. Norris, The Law of 
Salvage, in 3A Benedict on Admiralty§§ 150-151 (7th rev. ed. 1997). 
31 Norris, supra note 30, § 130; G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty§ 8-10 (2d ed. 1975). 
A third aspect of traditional marine salvage for which abandonment is relevant is a claim of salvage by 
the salvor against the owner in personam (as distinct from a claim against the recovered property itself 
in rem). Gilmore & Black, id.§ 8-13. 
32Norris, supra note 30, §§ 232-243; Schoenbaum, supra note 30, §§ 14-1, 14-5; Gilmore & Black, 
supra note 31, §§ 8-1, 8-8. 
33See, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned 
Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1988 AMC 1109 (!st Cir. 1987); Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 
1042, 1995 AMC 1665 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd mem., 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiarn), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1558 (1998); Moyer v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, known as Andrea Doria, 836 
F. Supp. 1099, 1994 AMC 1021 (D.N.J. 1993); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 
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Modern advances in the technologies applied to locate submerged wrecks 
in deep water, and to recover objects from such locations, have produced a 
harvest season of long lost shipwrecks.34 As a result, those who have located 
shipwrecks and recovered from them artifacts have applied to courts in 
admiralty with increasing frequency not only for the traditional salvor' s 
reward but also for a finder's title to that which they have recovered. 35 
Abandonment therefore has taken on a greater significance, especially in 
cases where the recovered goods may fairly be said to possess exceptional 
extrinsic value as cultural icons or historical evidence. 
It is black letter salvage law that a vessel in distress may be abandoned to 
others by the affirmative act of her owner or master.36 In recent derelict 
salvage cases, courts have split on the issue of whether abandonment of a 
ship (or its wreck) otherwise may be inferred from the mere passage of time 
186 F. Supp. 452, 1960 AMC 1774 (E.D. Va. 1960); Llewellyn v. Two Anchors and Chains, 15 F. Cas. 
711 (E.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 8,428); The Zealand, 30 F. Cas. 917 (D. Mass. 1865) (No. 18,205); 
Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 1987 AMC 2590 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1987), affd, 
531 N.E.2d 549, 1989 AMC 425 (Mass. 1988). 
34For a list of such advances, see Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper 
Ballast for the States, 37 Viii. L. Rev. 573, 575 n.6. (1992). For a detailed account of the employment 
of some of them in locating and recovering artifacts from a wreck at 8,000 feet, see G. Kinder, Ship of 
Gold in the Deep Blue Sea (1998). 
35In addition to Deep Sea Research, see, e.g., Fairport Int'I Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel 
Known as the Captain Lawrence, 105 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1558 
(1998); Zych v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Seabird, 19 F.3d 1136, 
1994 AMC 2672 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994); Columbus-America Discovery Group v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 1992 AMC 2705 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 
(1993); Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Sindia, 895 F.2d 116, 
1990 AMC 305 (3d Cir. 1990); Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked 
and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1988 AMC 1109 (!st Cir. 1987); Klein v. Unidentified 
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1985 AMC 2970 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Florida Dep't 
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340, 1981 AMC 1529 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part, rev'd 
in part, 458 U.S. 670, 1983 AMC 144 (1982); Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 
1051, 1981 AMC 1097 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); Marex Int'!, Inc. v. Unidentified, 
Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 952 F. Supp. 825, 1998 AMC 484 (S.D. Ga. 1997); Bemis v. RMS 
Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042, 1995 AMC 1665 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd mem., 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1558 (1998); Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and 
Abandoned Vessel, 857 F. Supp. 1129, 1995 AMC 1515 (D.V.I. 1994); Moyer v. Wrecked and 
Abandoned Vessel, known as Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. 1099, 1994 AMC 1021(D.N.J.1993); Lathrop 
v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Sub-Sal, Inc. v. The 
DeBraak, 1992 WL 39050 (D. Del. 1992); MOM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned 
Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 1987 AMC 537 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and 
Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 1985 AMC 609 (S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302, 
1986 AMC 1216 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing 
Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186. 1983 AMC 966 (S.D. Fla. 1981); People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation 
Agency v. Zych, 687 N.E.2d 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), appeal allowed, 690 N.E.2d 1387 (Ill. 1998); 
Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 1987 AMC 2590 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1987), affd, 
531 N.E.2d 549, 1989 AMC 425 (Mass. 1988). 
3677 A C.J.S. Salvage § 22 (1994); 68 Am. Jur. 2d Salvage § 53 (I 993); Norris, supra note 30, § 134. 
See also D. Steel & F. Rose, Kennedy's Law of Salvage§ 465 (5th ed. 1985). 
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and inactivity on the part of the owner. In Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. 
Brother Jonathan, 37 the Ninth Circuit found "the traditional rule" to be that 
abandonment could be inferred from "the lapse of time or the failure to 
pursue salvage efforts on the part of the owners."38 Previously, in Columbus-
America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,39 the Fourth 
Circuit had declared the rule to be that, ordinarily, a lapse of time following 
cessation of recovery attempts by the owner was insufficient to support an 
inference of shipwreck abandonment. According to the court, a different rule 
permitting such an inference from evidence of prolonged inactivity by the 
owner might nevertheless govern a shipwreck "ancient and long lost."40 In 
Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as 
the Captain Lawrence,41 the Sixth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit, taking 
the position that whatever might be the correct rule under the laws of salvage 
and finds, that espoused by the Fourth Circuit in Columbus-America 
Discovery Group would "render the [ASA] a virtual nullity," given the 
infrequency with which abandonment would occur under a rule requiring 
proof of an affirmative act of renunciation by the owner for the inference of 
abandonment to be drawn.42 In People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation 
Agency v. Zych,43 an Illinois state court followed the Sixth Circuit's ill-fated 
lead in Captain Lawrence. 
37 102 F.3d 379, 1997 AMC 315 (9th Cir. 1996). 
38Note that the Ninth Circuit presents lapse of time and inactivity as themselves alternative, citing 
only to Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam 
Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1988 AMC 1109 (1st Cir. 1987). In that case, abandonment was hardly at issue. 
Competing salvors, each claiming the vessel abandoned and therefore a find, disputed possession; the 
ship's owner did not appear to assert title at all. The court merely observed in passing that "without 
question, the [vessel] and its cargo had been long forsaken when discovered .... " It is surely incorrect 
to derive abandonment from the passage of time alone, if one can imagine time going by while recovery 
is diligently attempted. The disjunctive form did no harm in Deep Sea Research where the court of 
appeals eventually upheld the decision of the trial court that California had failed to produce adequate 
evidence from which abandonment could be inferred. Presumably this means that, if the court took the 
disjunctive form seriously, the state failed to proffer sufficient evidence that time had lapsed, as well as 
that the owners had been indolent. Because the lapse of time seems a fact appropriate for judicial notice, 
the amount of time that had lapsed between the vessel's sinking on July 30, 1865 and discovery of her 
remains in October 1993 must have itself been inadequate for both courts. 
39974 F.2d 450, 1992 AMC 2705 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993). 
40Id. at 464-65. 
41 105 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1558 (1998). 
42Id. at 1085. That the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of 
its decision in Deep Sea Research means only that the Sixth Circuit now must choose without assuming 
that what Congress intended in the ASA could be something different from what admiralty courts have 
found sufficient for an inference of abandonment. 
43687 N.E.2d 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), appeal allowed, 690 N.E.2d 1387 (Ill. 1998). 
216 Journal of Maritime law and Commerce Vol. 30, No. 2 
2. What tolls the inference of abandonment? 
Even if it should be settled that abandonment to the advantage of a finder 
may occur without an affirmative act of renunciation on the part of the 
owner, courts have been willing so far to excuse an owner's inaction, even 
when prolonged. Failing to undertake or continue efforts at recovery has 
been found justified on grounds of technological feasibility-as well as 
grounds more akin to economic efficiency. 
In Deep Sea Research, for example, the district court found that because 
shipwreck salvage under circumstances such as those of the Brother 
Jonathan was not technologically feasible until recently, prolonged inaction 
by the underwriters of the gold specie and bullion cargoes aboard was 
excused, foreclosing a finding that the wreck had been abandoned.44 
Similarly, in Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed 
to be SB lady Elgin,45 the district court decided that the underwriter "was 
not required to engage in efforts to recover the wreck in order to avoid 
abandoning its interest when such efforts would have had minimal chance of 
success."46 
If technological feasibility is to be a measure of excusable inaction, then 
the window of opportunity for doing nothing is clearly closing on owners 
(and their successors in interest), and recovery delay excused on such 
grounds should soon disappear from most shipwreck cases as courts take 
notice that technology has put all underwater wrecks within the reach of 
those with deep pockets and time to search.47 The future for a defense of 
delay excused by the absence of a commercially practicable recovery 
venture proposal is more difficult to predict, and would make excusable 
recovery delay on the part of the owner that is unexcused on the part of the 
salvor.48 
3. Will courts infer abandonment of a public vessel? 
That eventually the law might be settled so that abandonment to the 
advantage of a finder may occur generally without an affirmative act of 
renunciation on the part of the owner leaves open the question of whether 
44883 F. Supp. at 1351. 
45755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 960 F.2d 665, 1992 AMC 1817 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
46Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
47For a report on the newest and most inexpensive technologies, see Mather, Technology and the 
Search for Shipwrecks, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 175 (1999). 
48See Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861) (aspiring salvor not excused for delay during which he 
salvaged another vessel, or attributable to the lack of steam power aboard his vessel). 
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such a judgment could occur respecting the wreck of a vessel in which some 
government asserts one sort of ownership interest or another. In United 
States v. Steinmetz,49 the court, without discussing precedent to the con-
trary,50 found that the wrecks of United States warships are to be treated 
differently.51 In that case, the district court considered itself foreclosed by 
both Article IV, § 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution52 and 
international law53 from finding a United States warship abandoned in favor 
49763 F. Supp. 1293, 1991 AMC 2099 (D.N.J. 1991), affd, 973 F.2d 212, 1992 AMC 2879 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). Accord Kahn, Sunken Treasures: Conflicts Between Historic 
Preservation Law and the Maritime Law of Finds, 7 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 595, 637-38 (1994); Comment, 
Finders Weepers Losers Keepers: United States of America v. Steinmetz, the Doctrine of State 
Succession, Maritime Finds, and the Bell of the C.S.S. Alabama, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 479, 550-53 (1996). 
See Norris, supra note 30, § 150 (Cum. Supp. 1998). 
50State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902, 903, 1962 AMC 1061 (Fla.), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 881 (1957) (United States battleship wreck formerly used fortarget practice was derelict, so that 
title passed to sovereign Florida by common law). No appearance in the case was made for the United 
States. Cf. Baltimore, Crisfield & Onancock Line, Inc. v. United States, 140 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1944) 
(obsolete United States battleship used for target practice and eventually settling on the bottom was not, 
after 29 years, a "public vessel" within the meaning of the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 
781-790). In State ex rel. Bruton v. Flying "W" Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 1968 AMC 2125 (N.C. 
1968), the wrecks of several Confederate blockade runners were found to be abandoned, but it is not clear 
whether ownership by the United States was suggested to the court, nor, indeed, is it clear that the 
blockade runners in question were property of the Confederacy; they could have been merely private 
vessels licensed by the Confederacy for such ventures. 
51The actual holding was that abandonment of the wreck of the Alabama, a Confederate warship, 
could not be inferred from the prolonged failure to search for her. Judge Debevoise relied on Hatteras, 
Inc. v. U.S.S. Hatteras, 1984 AMC 1094 (S.D. Tex. 1981), affd mem., 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), which in tum relied upon United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 1947 
AMC 1579 (1947) (competing, but non-maritime, state and federal claims to offshore oil and gas 
deposits). 
52
''The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution 
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State." 
53Judge Debevoise had relied for this point of international law on a memorandum of law prepared 
for the Maritime Administration by the Department of State's Deputy Legal Adviser: 
After an extensive analysis of treaty law, commentaries, United States caselaw and foreign 
caselaw ... it is clear that under well-established State practice, States generally do not lose legal 
title over sunken warships through the mere passage of time in the absence of abandonment. They 
do not lose title during combat in the absence of an actual capture of the warships. Although 
abandonment may be implied under some circumstances, United States warships that were sunk 
during military hostilities are presumed not to be abandoned and are considered not subject to 
salvage in the absence of express consent from the United States Government. 
763 F. Supp. at 1299 (citing 1980 Digest of United States Practice in International Law 999, 1004-1005 
(M. Leich ed.)). Even the portion of the memorandum relied upon by the court in Steinmetz admits that 
abandonment of sunken United States warships by the United States may be implied in circumstances 
other than military hostilities. Elsewhere in the memorandum, the Assistant Legal Adviser admits more 
generally that implied abandonment of warships is accepted in United States courts and by the executive 
branch of the government. Leich, id. at 1003 (citing, apparently with approval, State ex rel. Bruton v. 
Flying "W" Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 1968 AMC 2125 (N.C. 1968) (Confederate "blockade runners" 
held abandoned)). 
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of a finder or salvor except when the abandonment has been communicated 
by a "formal act. "54 Thus, prolonged inaction by the federal government, 
otherwise inexcusable by a private owner, will not be enough to establish 
abandonment of the wreck in favor of a salvor or finder. 
On appeal, the decision was affirmed, but only to the extent that it rested 
on the constitutional ground.55 As far as the constitutional ground ought to 
go, the precise function and status of the derelict ought to be unimportant, so 
long as the government of the United States claims title by operation of one 
law or another, so that ships of the United States other than warships, or 
other public vessels for that matter, ought to be within its protection.56 
On the other hand, what about the alternative eschewed by the court of 
appeals in Steinmetz, namely that international law rules out an inference of 
the abandonment of a warship? Writing for the Third Circuit, Chief Judge 
Sloviter agreed with the appellant that the policy of the United States 
concerning abandonment of its sunken vessels has not always been consis-
tent, observing that the Department of State recognized the practice of 
treating warships from the 17th and 18th centuries as abandoned by 
54763 F. Supp. at 1299. When its tum came, the court of appeals interpreted the clause as limiting 
abandonment to "explicit acts." 973 F.2d at 222. Either modifier seems to rule out an inference of 
abandonment. 
55973 F.2d 212, 1992 AMC 2879 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). 
56The DOI assumes that abandonment may not be inferred with respect to any vessel entitled to 
sovereign immunity, including private vessels chartered or otherwise appropriated by the government 
when they are lost during any such government service. See ASA Guidelines, supra note 28, at 50121. 
The DOJ's assertion that a "Colonial privateer" is within the class thus protected surely must be the outer 
limit. 
For centuries before the Civil War ... , the nations of Europe had developed a series of practices 
recognized in treaties and international law that allowed a nation to issue a license to an individual 
or group authorizing the recipient to arm a privately owned vessel for the purposes of making war 
on the commerce of an enemy. The license was known as a Letter of Marque and Reprisal and was 
subject to a series of customs and international regulations concerning the treatment of captured 
ships, cargoes, and crews. In the days before governments became so efficient at collecting 
revenues, it was a way of attracting private capital to support a war effort. In return for purchasing, 
arming, equipping, and crewing a ship, the owners were allowed to benefit monetarily from the 
capture of enemy merchant ships .... Once a letter of Marque had been issued, the government had 
no control over the quality of the crew, or the movements of the vessel. 
W. Tidwell, April '65: Confederate Covert Action in the Civil War 83-84 (1995). During the War of 
1812, for example, 
[m]ost American merchant ships venturing out of port took out letters of marque. They were 
inexpensive and easily obtained; the ship ran no additional danger in carrying one, seeing that she 
and her cargo were forfeit in any case should she meet a British cruiser, and if by good fortune she 
should encounter an unescorted British merchant ship the letter of marque gave her a right to 
capture her if she could. 
C. Forester, The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812, 87 (1956). One may wonder 
whether a privately-operated blockade runner was sufficiently engaged in Confederate service to join the 
class which the DOI would have excluded from abandonment by inference. See further State ex rel. 
Bruton v. Flying "W" Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 1968 AMC 2125 (N.C. 1968) (Confederate and 
Spanish privateers). See also supra note 50. 
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implication of the long passage of time, and distinguishing United States 
warships of the 19th and 20th centuries, the titles to which ought to be 
presumed to remain in the United States.57 
Even if it is to be settled that United States warships and other public 
vessels are immune from an inference of abandonment, does this domestic 
rule oblige the same treatment for corresponding vessels of foreign sover-
eigns? Until quite recently, Spain had not appeared in court to contest 
abandonment of vessels from its imperial era, so that abandonment by their 
owner had been a foregone conclusion in disputes by rival claimants to 
title.58 In Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwreck Vessel or Vessels, 59 
Spain, acting through the United States, asserted against Virginia title to two 
frigates, La Galga and Juno, wrecked by storms off the Virginia coast in 
I 750 and 1802.60 Although the district court refused to permit the United 
States to act as Spain's representative, it found enough merit in Spain's 
position to grant it ninety days to retain proper counsel.61 If her claims 
ultimately are sustained, does Spain still own the Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 
and may she yet be heard to make that claim in our courts? 
4. What standard of proof applies to a claim of abandonment? 
In Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan,62 the Ninth Circuit held 
California to the standard applied in that circuit generally to proofs of 
affirmative defenses. Following the Ninth Circuit's lead, the Sixth Circuit 
held Michigan to the same standard in Fairport International Exploration, 
Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence. On the other 
57973 F.2d at 222. On the cusp of this distinction lies the wreck of the frigate Hussar in New York's 
East River. A British warship, she sank during the Revolutionary War in 1781 or 1782 and was 
rediscovered in 1823. In a dispute over possession between competing salvors, she was found by the New 
York Court of Chancery to have been abandoned. There is nothing in the report of the case to suggest 
that His Majesty's government presented any opposition. Deklyn v. Davis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 154 (1824). 
58See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340, 1981AMC1529 (5th Cir. 
1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 458 U.S. 670, 1983 AMC 144 (1982); Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified 
Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1981 AMC 1097 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); 
MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 1987 
AMC 537 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 
F. Supp. 186, 1983 AMC 966 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
5922 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
60See generally Duffy, Treasure Hunting is No Job for a Guy Out to Avoid Stress, Wall St. J., July 
17, 1998, at Al; Clancy, Search for Shipwrecks Wins Justice Go-Ahead, Virginian-Pilot, Jan. 26, 1998, 
at B2; Clancy, On Treasure's Trail, Virginian-Pilot, Sept. 21, 1997, at Al. 
61 22 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
62 102 F.3d 379, 1997 AMC 315 (9th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part. 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1998 
AMC 1521 (1998). 
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hand, in Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Co., the Fourth Circuit held the proponent to proof by evidence that was 
clear and convincing.63 For cases like Deep Sea Research (where the state is 
not in possession), it should matter not whether the proponent of abandon-
ment is a state or a salvor, now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
Eleventh Amendment considerations are irrelevant to the issue. This leaves 
the question of whether maritime law otherwise so frowns upon abandon-
ment in the special context of a shipwreck, when abandonment is alleged to 
secure not just occupancy or possession for a salvor, but also title for a 
finder. 64 
5. When is a claim of title sufficiently colorable for a state 
out of possession? 
If the answer from Deep Sea Research is that, where the state is not in 
possession, the same burden of proof rests on a state proponent of 
abandonment as would rest on a salvor proponent, what about cases like 
Treasure Salvors, where the state proponent of abandonment was m 
possession? For the time being, Deep Sea Research may be viewed as 
merely restricting the application of the rule from Treasure Salvors to 
actions in rem in which the state has possession of the res. 
After Treasure Salvors, admiralty courts were left to decide whether a 
claim of title was colorable enough to entitle a possessing state to dismissal 
of the salvage action in rem simply because the state asserted abandonment. 
In Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Aban-
doned Sailing Vessel,65 the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action in 
rem after Massachusetts entered a special appearance and sought dismissal, 
asserting title pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act66 and a state statute. 
This was enough for the court so that it forbore further examination of the 
colorability of the state's claim.67 In Marx v. Government of Guam,68 the 
63974 F.2d 450, 464, 1992 AMC 2075 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993). Accord 
Moyer v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, known as Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. 1099, 1104, 1994 AMC 
1021 (D.N.J. 1993). In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 
546 F. Supp. 919, 1983 AMC 2040 (S.D. Fla. 1981), the district court, without first setting out the 
standard to be applied, found the evidence of abandonment "clear and convincing." Id. at 926. 
64
"Where the circumstances are doubtful, the Court will be slow to infer that property of great value 
has been abandoned, unless it is proved that there was no reasonable hope of recovery." Norris, supra 
note 30, § 71, at 6-6 (quoting Dr. Lushington in The Florence, 16. Jur. 572). 
65717 F.2d 6, 1984 AMC 249 (!st Cir. 1983). 
6643 U.S.C. § 1311. 
67717 F.2d at 8. 
68866 F.2d 294, 300-301, 1989 AMC 896 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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Ninth Circuit followed the same approach.69 These cases, because they 
suggest that a state's assertion of abandonment is unassailable, seem to beg 
the question of what makes a claim sufficiently colorable so as to entitle a 
state claimant to dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 
6. For a state, what is enough possession of a wreck or artifact? 
In Treasure Salvors, the state had physical custody, allegedly unlawful, of 
at least some artifacts from the wreck. In Deep Sea Research, the state did 
not even know where the wreck was to be found. A wide range of 
circumstantial possibilities exists between these extremes. If possession is 
critical to the Eleventh Amendment distinction between Treasure Salvors 
and Deep Sea Research, then what constitutes possession of the site 
sufficient to shift a state's claim from the class governed by Treasure 
Salvors to the class governed by Deep Sea Research? Possession and 
occupancy are closely related in cases where salvors compete for a wreck, 
and something more in the way of occupancy than press announcements and 
overhead buoys is required of a salvor who, asserting possession, would 
enlist the court in excluding competitors.70 Now that artifact and wreck 
possession are critical to the involvement of the admiralty courts in such 
cases, will they hold a state possessor to the same degree of active 
possession as they have demanded from salvors? 
7. What if only part of the wreck has been abandoned? 
In theory, at least, the law of finds applies to more property on navigable 
waters than does the law of salvage. The latter is said to apply only to marine 
property, and marine property once meant vessels, their hulls, engines, 
tackle and appurtenances, as well as cargo, whether or not still aboard. It 
may now mean "anything rescued from navigable waters, without regard to 
what it is or how it got there."71 Because abandonment is so critical to 
jurisdiction and control of a shipwreck, as well as to title of what is found 
69In neither case was the government, state or territorial, in possession of the wreck or an artifact. 
When the court later affirmed, holding California to proof of abandonment by a preponderance of the 
evidence, it dwelt on the intervening passage of the ASA as a basis for limiting Marx. 
70Indian River Recovery Co. v. Faithful Stewart, 1986 WL 7513 (D. Del. 1986) (dismissal of salvage 
action in rem when libellant had yet to dive the wreck). 
71 Schoenbaum, supra note 30, § 14-2; Gilmore & Black, supra note 31, § 8-3, at 538; G. Robinson, 
Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States§ 98, at 712-13 (1939). In Broere v. Two Thousand 
One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115, 1947 AMC 1523 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), the court held 
a wallet full of money subject to salvage after it had been recovered from a corpse found floating in the 
harbor. The court in Broere relied upon The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434), in which 
the court allowed a salvor' s claim for recovery from a shipwreck of two trunks, one containing theatrical 
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there, what will happen when the successor in interest to cargo or its insurer 
intervenes, or the heirs of passengers lay claim to long lost baggage or other 
personal effects? 
In Bemis v. RMS Lusitania,72 the shipwreck's finder, claiming title to the 
ship as successor in interest of her insurer, claimed title to cargo and 
personal effects both because he had title to the ship and as their finder. The 
district court declined to give him title to the cargo or personal effects just 
because he had title to the vessel in which they went down. Relying on cases 
relating only to cargo, the court concluded, however, that as their finder he 
could get title to both cargo and personal effects-but only after he had 
recovered them. 
In Deep Sea Research v. Brother Jonathan,73 the finder claimed title to 
some of the wrecked vessel's cargo as the successor in interest to the cargo's 
insurers. There was no evidence of insurance for the remainder of the cargo, 
the vessel herself, passenger baggage, or the personal effects of master and 
crew. California claimed title to the uninsured items by way of abandon-
ment. Because, at that point, the aspiring salvor and finder sought only 
possession of the site of the shipwreck and not yet title to all that was 
recovered, the district court found premature inference of abandonment of 
the uninsured items. However, the court foresaw that the salvor and finder 
"could potentially face competing claims from the heirs of those lost at 
sea."74 
dresses and the other, belonging to the supercargo, containing 500 dollars. Bills of exchange and drafts 
in the same trunk were not subject to salvage. According to Judge Marvin: 
Bills of exchange or other papers, evidences of debt or of title to property, are not liable to salvage; 
nor is the clothing of the masters and crew. In this district [Florida], the wreckers have never 
demanded salvage upon the clothing or personal baggage of the master, crew or passengers; nor 
upon the master's charts and instruments of navigation. 
W. Marvin, A Treatise on the Law of Wreck and Salvage§ 123 (1858). 
72884 F. Supp. 1042, 1995 AMC 1665 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd mem., 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1558 (1998). 
73883 F. Supp. 1343, 1995 AMC 1682 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 102 F.3d 379, 1997 AMC 315 (9th 
Cir. 1996), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1998 AMC 1521 (1998). 
74883 F. Supp. at 1354. Twenty-nine descendants and relatives of the passengers who had sailed 
aboard the Central America on her last voyage were at the pier when the salvage vessel Arctic Discoverer 
brought back artifacts from the shipwreck in 1988. Kinder, supra note 34, at 486. Among the items 
recovered two years later was a trunk in which had been well preserved a newspaper, toiletries, various 
items of clothing, dueling pistols, as well as wedding presents and personal keepsakes. The trunk 
belonged to passengers Addie and Aste! Easton. Id. at 497-98. Still to be located is a portfolio of 200 
drawings by the naturalist and illustrator John Woodhouse Audubon. Cf. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked 
and Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624, 636 (E.D. Va. 1998) (public interest prompts keeping together 
artifacts recovered from a wreck of considerable historical significance), and 1996 AMC 2497, 2499 
(E.D. Va. 1996). 
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8. How much of a wreck must be embedded? 
Under the ASA, Congress transferred to the states title to abandoned 
vessels embedded in coral or the bottom. 75 In Deep Sea Research, California 
had claimed that the Brother Jonathan was both abandoned and embedded 
in the ocean floor, failing to offer evidence of either sufficient to persuade 
the trial judge. Later, the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the 
question of abandonment, but said nothing about reconsideration of the issue 
of embeddedness. Assuming that embeddedness is also a determination a 
priori to application of the ASA, and that the Eleventh Amendment is as 
irrelevant to embeddedness as it is to abandonment, it remains to be seen 
how much embedded is embedded enough, for the law of finds and the 
ASA.76 
9. Is the ASA ultra vires because it impairs a central aspect of 
admiralty law? 
Perhaps this question might better be phrased as, "Is there really less to the 
ASA than meets the eye?" The courts that have ruled on the Act have so 
concluded, and found the statute therefore constitutionally unobjectionable. 
In Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be SB 
Seabird,77 the ASA was attacked as unconstitutional both because it 
imperrnissibly interferes with admiralty jurisdiction and because it destroys 
the uniformity constitutionally required of legislation affecting maritime 
law. Respecting the former, the district court first relied upon Detroit Trust 
Co. v. The Thomas Barlum78 and Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges. 
75 A wreck is embedded for purposes of the ASA when tools of excavation are required to gain access 
to the vessel. 43 U.S.C. § 2102(a). The DOI has opined in the ASA Guidelines that dredges, explosives, 
prop wash deflectors, air lifts, blowtorches, induction equipment, chemicals, and mechanical tools used 
to displace sediments or coral are tools of excavation, see supra note 28 at 50120, but that diving 
equipment normally worn by recreational divers is not. Id. at 50117. 
76In Deep Sea Research, the court found that the Brother Jonathan rested on the bottom and 
concluded that her settling into the bottom was, after 128 years, inevitable. 883 F. Supp. at 1355. In 
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 1985 AMC 609 
(S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302, 1986 AMC 1216 (I I th Cir. 1985), it was enough for the court that 
a portion of the wrecked hull of the Nashville was partially embedded in the river bottom. Because this 
case preceded the ASA, the court was not invited to consider the necessity of using tools for access. 
Whether embeddedness is a transient condition also remains to be seen. In Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 
(1861), the wreck of the steamboat America gradually disappeared under an island formed from the 
river's action, until trees grew above it to thirty feet or more. Eventually, changes in the river's action 
worked to erode the island until the wreck reappeared underwater. Id. at 508. 
77746 F. Supp. 1334, 1991 AMC 359 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 941F.2d525, 1992 AMC 532 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
78293 U.S. 21, 1934 AMC 1417 (1934). 
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Franz Lange G.m.b.H. & Co., K.G. 79 for a distinction between forbidden 
legislative changes to maritime jurisdiction and permissible legislative 
changes to the substantive maritime law, and then found that the ASA 
altered only the substantive law to be applied to abandoned wrecks.80 
Turning to the uniformity limit, the court found it only required a national 
law on maritime matters that was consistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
So long as embedded shipwrecks are treated the same from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, that they are treated differently by the ASA from shipwrecks not 
embedded does not violate the Constitution. 81 
With the trial court's finding in SB Seabird that the ASA altered 
substantive law, but not jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit did not agree, 
finding to the contrary that Congress clearly intended to change from federal 
to state the forum in which certain shipwreck cases would be heard.82 By the 
same token, the court of appeals, relying on Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 83 
thought some Congressional changes to admiralty jurisdiction could be 
constitutional, so long as they worked only at the margins of that jurisdic-
tion. The court stopped there, content to remand for a determination as to 
whether the Seabird was embedded in the first place.84 With the trial court's 
finding that the ASA did no damage to the uniformity of maritime law, on 
the other hand, the court of appeals did agree, noting that what differences 
arose from variations in the state laws applied to such wrecks after title 
passed under the ASA were irrelevant as the matter had passed by then from 
the sphere of maritime law.85 After the trial court on remand found the 
Seabird to be embedded in the bottom of Lake Michigan, the Seventh Circuit 
had another look at whether the ASA unconstitutionally interferes with 
admiralty jurisdiction when it prohibits application of salvage law to 
shipwrecks covered by the Act. The court of appeals found that, because the 
law of salvage does not apply to abandoned shipwrecks anyway, its 
displacement by the ASA is merely an illusion. 86 
79 387 F. Supp. 440, 1975 AMC 1684 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (three-judge court). 
80746 F. Supp. at 1345. 
81 1d. at 1347. 
82941 F.2d at 531. 
83264 U.S. 375, 1924 AMC 551 (1924). 
84941 F.2d at 531-32. 
85Id. at 532-33. In Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953 (M.D. 
Fla. 1993), the court relied on this reasoning in upholding National Park Service restrictions on salvage 
within the Cape Canaveral National Seashore. Id. at 957. 
86Zych v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Seabird, 19 F.3d 1136, 
1140-1141, 1994 AMC 2672 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994). Because the appellant had 
discarded his claim to title as the finder of the wreck by the time he returned to the court of appeals, the 
panel did not have to consider the ASA's displacement of the law of finds as applied to abandoned 
shipwrecks. 
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In Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned 
Vessel, 87 the court found that the ASA does not violate the Constitution 
because it displaces the law of finds that would otherwise apply to 
abandoned and embedded shipwrecks. The court held that because, under 
the law of finds, the state would get title to a wreck embedded at the bottom 
of state waters anyway, that the ASA displaced the law of finds only to 
otherwise give states title did not make the Act unconstitutional. For this 
court too, the ASA worked merely an illusion, as title belonged to the state 
both before and after the Act's application. 
These are both glib answers. There is an air of clever sophistry to the 
Seventh Circuit's delimiting of the law of salvage in SB Seabird. Once, it 
may have been true that the law of finds and the law of salvage were 
mutually exclusive, when the former determined possession and the latter 
title, but too often of late have admiralty courts applied the law of finds to 
claims of title based solely on possession through salvage for that doctrinal 
boundary to remain clear. The rule of Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, that 
Congressional changes to admiralty jurisdiction are constitutional only if 
they are marginal, however, surely encourages relativistic demarcation of 
the legal seascape. The same sophistry pervades the decision in Sunken 
Treasure, which assumes far too readily88 that the law of finds puts title to 
shipwrecks in the state, so that the ASA is redundant. How ironic that an Act 
of Congress is only constitutional because it is ineffectual! 
I 0. Does the ASA unconstitutionally encroach upon state sovereignty? 
The Constitution restricts Congress' power to intrude through legislation 
on the sovereignty retained by states. In another phase of her finder's legal 
87857 F. Supp. 1129, 1995 AMC 1515 (D.V.l. 1994). 
88To the contrary, see Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 
569 F.2d 330, 339, 1978 AMC 1404 (5th Cir. 1978); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and 
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 555 n.14, 1983 AMC 1018 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Cobb Coin 
Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 189-90, 1983 AMC 966 
(S.D. Fla. 1981 ). Contra Marx v. Government of Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 1989 AMC 896 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 1985 AMC 609 
(S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302, 1986 AMC 1216 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. 
Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Sindia, 710 F. Supp. 1020, 1989 AMC 1319 (D.N.J. 
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 895 F.2d 116, 1990 AMC 305 (3d Cir. 1990). 
The majority of federal courts presented with a salvage claim to resolve have decided that (I) the 
[Submerged Lands Act] did not specifically assert U.S. title to shipwrecks and transfer that title to 
the states; and (2) state historic preservation laws whose provisions are inconsistent with federal 
common law admiralty principles are superseded by those principles under the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution .... At a minimum, these decisions have led to confusion over the ownership 
of, and responsibility for, historic shipwrecks in State waters. 
H.R. Rep. No. 514(11), lOOth Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, at 2-3, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 370, 371. 
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campaign to secure rights in what is left of the Seabird, the ASA was 
attacked on the grounds that it violated the Tenth Amendment and notions 
of state sovereignty otherwise implicit in the Constitution. For this propo-
sition, the finder relied upon New York v. United States,89 in which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ("LLRWPAA")90 that it 
found compelled states to take title, in certain circumstances, to radioactive 
waste produced within their borders.91 
In this iteration of Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 
Believed to be SB Seabird, the district court agreed with the government that 
two differences between the take-title provisions in the LLRWPAA and the 
ASA sustained the latter against an attack based on New York v. United 
States: first, title to abandoned shipwrecks passed at Congressional com-
mand not from private parties to the state but from the United States to the 
state, and second, the title given was not to undesirable property but to 
property apparently welcome, as evidenced by the passage of historic 
shipwreck legislation in twenty-eight states.92 
The relevance of the first distinction to distribution of power among 
coordinate sovereigns has yet to emerge; the context of state legislation, 
more or less correspondent, does not change a command into an invitation.93 
Even if states would always welcome title to shipwrecks on the seabed of 
state waters, the fact remains that it is thrust on them by Congress, not left 
to take or decline at their option. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Supreme Court in California v. Deep Sea Research, 
Inc. rests on very narrow constitutional grounds. Many questions of the 
traditional maritime Jaw of salvage, and its foster child, the maritime law of 
finds, which have been prompted by the competition for control of newly 
accessible historic shipwrecks, are left unanswered in the wake of the 
Brother Jonathan. This is not necessarily cause for disappointment in view 
89505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
9042 u.s.c. §§ 2021 b-202 lj. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 202le(d)(2)(C). According to the Supreme Court, Congress can neither commandeer 
state governments into the service of federal regulatory processes, nor can it command them to implement 
legislation enacted by Congress. For that reason, the statute under review could not compel the state of 
New York either to take title to waste generated in New York, nor could it otherwise compel New York 
to regulate the disposal of such waste. 
92811 F. Supp. 1300, 1317-19, 1993 AMC 2201 (N.D. Ill. 1992), affd, 19 F.3d 1136, 1994 AMC 
2672 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994). 
93The Tenth Amendment claim was not addressed by the court of appeals. 
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of the increasingly greater attention to them lately required of federal courts 
more comfortable and familiar with the law of admiralty. 
Not without misstep, the courts with jurisdiction over United States 
waters are working through answers attending to the competing interests of 
all concerned: state governments, historic preservationists, marine archae-
ologists, professional shipwreck hunters, and recreational scuba divers. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court works its way toward reconciliation of the 
Eleventh Amendment and its associated doctrines with the jurisprudence of 
the admiralty jurisdiction clause of Article III. 

